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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JERRI SUE TEUSCHER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 930303-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp. 1993). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes, rules and constitutional 
provisions are set forth in full in Addendum A: 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 4 03 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 404(b) 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12 
U.S. Const, amend. V 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence 
of other bad acts under Rule 404(b)? 
Standard of review -- CORRECTNESS. 
Because the admission of evidence under Rule 4 04(b) is a 
question "of law, it is viewed for correctness. However, 
the trial court's subsidiary factual determinations 
should be given deference by the appellate court and only 
be overruled when they are clearly erroneous." State v. 
Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 568 (Utah App. 1991) (citation 
omitted); see also State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 
n. 11 (Utah 1993) (recognizing bifurcated standard when 
appeals court reviews underlying factual findings). When 
reviewing a trial court's balancing of the probativeness 
of a piece of evidence against its potential for unfair 
prejudice under Rule 403, we reverse only if the court's 
decision as a matter of law "was beyond the limits of 
reasonability." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 
(Utah 1992). 
State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 698-9 (Utah App. 1993). Broad 
discretion is given to the trial court's determination to admit or 
exclude evidence under Rule 403. State v. Pena, No. 930101, slip 
op. at 8 (Utah February 15, 1993). 
2. If the other bad act evidence was properly 
admissible under Rule 404 (b), whether the trial court erred in its 
determination that the probativeness of the evidence outweighed its 
potential for unfair prejudice under Rule 403? 
Standard of Review. See standard for issue 1. 
3. Whether the trial court erred in denying appellant's 
motion to suppress statements made without benefit of a Miranda 
warning? 
Standard of review. Where the underlying facts are not 
in dispute, an appellate court reviews the trial court's conclusion 
as to whether the individual was in custody for correctness. 
State v. Wood, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 18 (Utah 1993); see also 
State v. Mirquet, 844 P.2d 995, 997 (Utah App. 1992). Any 
underlying factual findings will not be set aside unless they are 
clearly erroneous. Wood, 22 9 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18; People v. 
Russo, 196 Cal. Rptr. 466, 468 (Cal.App. 1983). 
4. Whether the trial court erred in failing at any 
recess in the proceedings to admonish the jury not to form an 
opinion? 
Standard of review. This is a question of statutory 
interpretation reviewed for correctness. In re Estate of Anderson, 
821 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 1991). 
2 
5. Whether prosecutorial misconduct requires that Ms. 
Teuscher be granted a new trial? 
Standard of review. 
When objections are not made at trial and properly 
preserved, appellate review is under a "plain error" 
standard. Plain errors are those that "should have been 
obvious to the trial court and that affect the 
substantial rights of the accused." 
State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting 
State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1210-11 (Utah App. 1991) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On December 16, 1991, Richard Oscar Christensen1 went 
into respiratory and cardiac arrest while at Ms. Teuscher's home 
day care. Ms. Teuscher phoned 911, but efforts at resuscitation 
were unable to restore unaided life functions. Rocky died shortly 
after termination of life support on December 17, 1991. By 
information dated March 6, 1992, appellant Jerri Sue Teuscher was 
charged with depraved indifference murder, a 1st degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1) (c) (Supp. 1993) . R. 7-9. 
Pretrial motions were heard on December 29, 1992. R. 
325-444. A jury trial was held on February 8-18, 1993. See 
transcripts, R. 445-2269 (ten volumes, with a separate volume for 
closing arguments). The jury returned a guilty verdict for a 
lesser included offense, manslaughter, a 2nd degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1990). R. 284. Ms. 
Teuscher was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 1 to 15 years at 
^ o m September 23, 1991, "Rocky" was approximately 2M months 
old at the time of his death. 
3 
the Utah State Prison, together with full restitution.2 R. 2327; 
3 07 (Judgment, Sentence, Commitment). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State filed a motion in limine to allow presentation 
of evidence of other bad acts. R. 25-40 (motion); 41-61 
(memorandum); 76-9 (supplement); 82-7 (defendant's memorandum in 
opposition). The trial court granted significant portions of the 
State's motion. R. 185-91 at 186-90. 
The State mentioned Ms. Teuscher's prior bad acts in 
opening statements. R. 615-6 (vl.175-6). The State's prior bad 
acts evidence was presented in its case-in-chief. See discussion 
and record cites infra at Point I, p. 7. 
Dr. Michael Dean, the treating physician for Rocky's 
arrest, found no retinal hemorrhages. R. 819 (v2.122). Dr. Robert 
Folberg, an ophthalmologist and pathologist from Iowa, R. 958 
(v3.2), who examined Rocky's eyes at the request of the medical 
examiner, R. 977-8 (v3.22-3), testified concerning various 
hemorrhages and abnormalities found in Rocky's eyes. R. 979-87 
(v3.24-32) . "The interesting thing about this case, the things we 
see most frequently in shaken baby [syndrome] are not seen in this 
case." R. 988 (v3.33). Dr. Folberg had never seen a similar 
collection of injuries in any patient before. R. 990 (v3.35) . Dr. 
Folberg testified that it is unlikely that CPR could have caused 
this constellation of injuries. R. 1001 (v3.46). 
2As yet undetermined as to amount. 
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The autopsy revealed no trauma around Rocky7s eyes. R. 
1642-3 (v6.25-6) (Dr. Maureen Frikke, M.E.). Dr. Frikke found 
injuries around Rocky's brain stem and spinal chord. R. 1591-2 
(v5.170-1). The injuries were atypical for shaken baby syndrome. 
R. 16 02 (v5.182) . Dr. Frikke had seen three children with somewhat 
similar injuries. R. 1603 (v5.183). Dr. Frikke testified the 
injuries were consistent with holding the infant by the head and 
shaking the body back and forth or side to side. R. 1611 (v5.191) . 
She opined it was highly unlikely the injuries could be the result 
of a fall into a playpen. R. 1613 (v5.193) . The medical examiner 
admitted that it was possible that there was "some other mechanism 
of injury" responsible for Rocky's injuries and death. R. 1647-8 
(v6.30-31). The M.E. could not rule out accident as the possible 
cause of death. R. 1654 (v6.37). The medical examiner found the 
manner of death to be undetermined. The final paragraph of the 
autopsy report reads: "Blunt force injuries were not present in 
Richard. From post mortem findings, it could not be ascertained 
whether the injuries occurred as a result of a deliberate act or 
whether the injuries occurred as a result of a careless or 
accident[al] act." R. 1653 (v6.36). 
Dr. Marion Walker, a member of the child protection team 
at Primary Children's Hospital, testified that the injuries found 
in Rocky were consistent with shaking while held by the head, R. 
1728 (v7.69), and that Rocky went into arrest immediately upon 
sustaining his injury. R. 1730 (v7.71). Dr. Walker unequivocally 
ruled out accident as a possible cause of Rocky's injuries. R. 
5 
1733 (v7.74). Dr. Walker ruled out the possibility that a four 
year old could have been responsible. R. 1734-5 (v7.75-6). 
Dr. William Palmer, director of the child protection team 
at Primary Children's Hospital, testified concerning the 
significance of changing stories. R. 1836 (v8.44), 1861 (v8.69). 
Dr. Palmer also concurred that the most likely mechanism of injury 
was shaking by the head. R. 1847 (v8.55). Dr. Palmer testified 
that cardiac arrest would have occurred within minutes after the 
shaking event. R. 1848 (v8.56). Dr. Palmer testified concerning 
a study involving 422 children who fell from heights of less than 
five feet, and none of those cases resulted in significant 
injuries. R. 1854 (v8.62). Dr. Palmer confirmed that the autopsy 
results here were unique. R. 1866 (v8.74), 1879 (v8.87). 
Ms. Teuscher denied shaking Rocky. R. 2063 (v9.134), 
2074 (V9.145), 2123A (v9.195). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The prior bad acts evidence admitted by the trial court 
should have been excluded under Rule 4 04 (b) . Intent is not an 
element of depraved indifference homicide, and lack of accident and 
identity were not seriously disputed. Similar defenses presented 
upon accusation are not a proper basis for State argument or 
introduction of prior bad act evidence. The prior bad acts 
evidence had very little or no probative value. 
Under Rule 403, the prior bad act evidence should have 
been excluded as more unfairly prejudicial than probative. Prior 
bad act evidence was weak, the acts were dissimilar and remote, 
6 
there was no need for the evidence as other evidence was more than 
adequate, and the prejudice was extreme. 
Statements of Ms. Teuscher taken by the police without 
benefit of Miranda warnings should have been suppressed. These 
statements were used to support the State's improper arguments 
concerning the changing stories and cover-ups involved in the 
Austin Marston broken leg incident and the Rocky Christensen 
cardiopulmonary arrest incident, and greatly prejudiced Ms. 
Teuscher. 
The trial court failed to admonish the jury to keep an 
open mind and not form opinions at recesses. The length of this 
trial exacerbated this omission. The jury formed improper opinions 
long before Ms. Teuscher had any opportunity to present her case, 
in violation of her right to a fair trial. 
The prosecution committed misconduct in several 
instances. This misconduct was plain and prejudicial to Ms. 
Teuscher. She should be granted a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF PRIOR BAD ACTS UNDER 
RULE 4 04(b). 
The trial court granted the State's motion to elicit the 
following evidence: 
a. Testimony from Jody Merrill, daughter of the 
defendant, concerning (1) an incident where the 
defendant allegedly picked up a baby by the arm and threw 
7 
the baby across the room onto a bed;3 (2) an incident 
where the defendant allegedly shook an older boy by the 
shoulders when he couldn't find his backpack;4 (3) 
having children in closets and storage rooms;5 and (4) 
Ms. Teuscher's statements concerning Austin Marston's 
broken leg.6 
b. Testimony from various individuals concerning 
a November 19, 1990 incident in which five month old 
Austin Marston allegedly sustained a broken leg while in 
Ms. Teuscher' s care.7 
c. Testimony by neighbor Bentley Wilson about 
picking a 3-4 year old child up under the arms and 
shaking him.8 
d. Testimony by neighbor Brenda Wilson (wife of 
Bentley) concerning pulling a child to her by the hair, 
and yanking him over a railing by one arm.9 
3Elicited at trial at R. 1374-5 (v4.230-1). 
4Elicited at trial at R. 1373-4 (v4.229-30). 
5Elicited at trial at R. 1375-6 (v4.231-2). 
6Elicited at trial at R. 1377 (v4.233). 
7Elicited at trial at R. 615 (vl.175)(prosecutor's opening 
statement), 1127-8 (v3.173-4), 1236-48(v4.91-103 (father, Dave 
Marston), 1306-39 (v4.161-194)(investigating detective, Charles 
Trost), 1342-1342A (v4.197-8) (client parent Cyndie Howard), 1377 
(v4.233) (daughter Jody Merrill re: statements made by Ms. 
Teuscher), 
8Elicited at trial at R. 1394-1403 (v4.251-60), 1407-8 
(v4.264-5). 
9Elicited at trial at R. 1408-1423 (v4.265-80). 
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e. Testimony concerning children being placed in 
closets.10 
R. 185-91 at 186-90. 
In State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988), the Utah 
Supreme Court outlined the purpose and operation of Rule 4 04(b): 
The general rule prohibiting evidence that a 
defendant committed other crimes was established, not 
because that evidence is logically irrelevant, but 
because it tends to skew or corrupt the accuracy of the 
fact-finding process. . . . Thus, evidence of other 
crimes is generally inadmissible unless it tends to have 
a special relevance to a controverted issue and is 
introduced for a purpose other than to show the 
defendant's predisposition to criminality. State v. 
Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985). 
Even if evidence of other crimes is probative 
of a particular element of a crime and is not offered 
merely to show criminal predisposition, such evidence is 
not automatically admissible under Rule 404(b). 10 J. 
Moore & H. Bendix, Moore's Federal Practice, § 404.21 [2] 
(2d ed. 1988). Its tendency to lead the finder of fact 
to an improper basis for decision must still be balanced 
against its probative value and the need for such 
evidence in proving a particular issue. E. Cleary, 
McCormick on Evidence, § 190, at 565 (3d ed. 1984) 
suggests the factors to be evaluated in the balancing 
process: 
The problem is not merely one of pigeonholing, 
but of classifying and then balancing. In deciding 
whether the danger of unfair prejudice and the like 
substantially outweighs the incremental probative 
value, a variety of matters must be considered, 
including the strength of the evidence as to the 
commission of the other crime, the similarities 
between the crimes, the interval of time that has 
elapsed between the crimes, the need for the 
evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and 
10Elicited at trial at R. 1375-6 (v4.231-2) (daughter Jody 
Merrill), 1460 (v5.38) (detective Jill Candland), 1553-1564 
(v5.132-143) (church counselor Nora Cook), 2019-25 (v9.90-96) 
(defendant, countering evidence presented by the State), 2115-7 
(v9.186-8) (cross of defendant). The State refers to this evidence 
in closing argument at R. 2174 (closing.13) and 2255-8 (closing.96-
99) . 
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the degree to which the evidence probably will 
rouse the jury to overmastering hostility. 
Shickles, 760 P.2d at 295; accord State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 
424, 426 (Utah 1989); O'Neil, 848 P.2d at 701. 
"We have recognized, however, and must continue to 
recognize, that the various categories of exceptions -- intent, 
design or plan, identity, etc. -- are not magic passwords whose 
mere incantation will open wide the courtroom doors to whatever 
evidence may be offered in their names." United States v. Goodwin, 
492 F.2d 1141, 1155 (5th Cir. 1974) . "Such evidence may be 
admitted only if the evidence has a very high degree of 
probativeness with respect to a particular element of the crime 
charged and will not otherwise result in undue prejudice." State 
v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 963 (Utah 1989). 
A. THE OTHER BAD ACTS EVIDENCE HERE IS NOT 
PROBATIVE OF ANY MATERIAL ISSUE OTHER 
THAN CHARACTER. 
The State asserted that the prior bad acts evidence it 
introduced was relevant to identity, lack of accident or mistake, 
and intent. See State's memorandum, R. 41-60.xl As detailed 
below, the evidence adduced by the State was not properly 
admissible for any of these purposes. 
i:LAlthough the State initially purports to assert "absence of 
accident, intent, knowledge, opportunity, motive, and common scheme 
or plan," R. 42, a careful reading of the memorandum indicates that 
only absence of accident, intent, and identity are seriously 
argued. The trial court's order (R. 185-92 at 187-9), as prepared 
by the State, makes clear that the ruling is based on only these 
three grounds. See also R. 332 (State's oral argument on motion; 
"identity . . . the absence of accident and intent are the three 
primary theories the State is arguing at this point."). 
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Shickles requires that prior bad acts evidence must have 
a "special relevance to a controverted issue." 760 P.2d at 295; 
accord, Featherson, 781 P. 2d at 426. Even though the evidence may-
be capable of being "pigeonholed" into one of the 4 04(b) 
exceptions, admissibility does not necessarily follow.12 The court 
must undertake an analysis of whether the particular issue is 
genuinely disputed. 
In Shickles, "intent and mental state were hotly 
contested issues." 760 P. 2d at 296. The question presented was 
whether defendant took the victim to Denver with implied permission 
from her parents, or whether she was taken for improper purposes. 
The Supreme Court permitted evidence of sexual misconduct that 
occurred in Denver because it was probative of whether the victim 
was taken for improper purposes. 
The Featherson court criticized admission of evidence of 
other bad acts because the State's purpose for offering the 
evidence, identity, was not disputed. The Supreme Court quoted at 
length from People v. Tassell, 679 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Cal. 1984) : 
As noted at the outset, this case presented no 
issue of identity. No rational argument would 
support a contention that the three sets of sex 
crimes were part of one larger plan. There being no 
issue of identity, it is immaterial whether the 
modus operandi of the charged crime was similar to 
that of the uncharged offenses. While the People 
rely on the 'common plan or scheme' rationale for 
admissibility, under the circumstances that is 
merely a euphemism for 'disposition.' 
(Footnotes omitted.) Similarly, since identity was not 
an issue in this case and the apparently uncharged 
120f course, Rule 4 03 analysis is an ever-present basis for 
exclusion in appropriate cases. See Point II, infra at 26. 
11 
misconduct in 1977 and 1978 (nine and ten years ago) 
cannot be viewed, along with the instant charges, to be 
part of one large plan, it was error to admit the 
uncharged incidents. 
Featherson, 781 P. 2d at 429. The Featherson court ultimately found 
the error harmless, however. 
The State bears the burden of showing that the evidence 
it seeks to elicit has some special relevance to a material issue 
in the case. United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 1373 (10th 
Cir. 1989); United States v. Mehrmanesh, 689 F.2d 822, 830 (9th 
Cir. 1982) . "There must be a clear and logical connection between 
the alleged earlier offense or misconduct and the case being 
tried." United States v. Biswell, 700 F.2d 1310, 1317-8 (10th Cir. 
1983) . 
1. Intent was not an issue at all, much 
less a disputed issue in this case. 
Ms. Teuscher's intent was not at issue, and the prior bad 
acts evidence should not have been admitted for that purpose. The 
State charged Ms. Teuscher only with depraved indifference 
homicide. R. 7-9. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(c) (Supp. 1993), 
provides: 
76-5-203. Murder. 
(1)Criminal homicide constitutes murder if the 
actor: 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a 
depraved indifference to human life 
engages in conduct which creates a grave 
risk of death to another and thereby 
causes the death of another; 
In State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984), the Utah 
Supreme Court definitively determined the mens rea requirement for 
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depraved indifference homicide. The State must prove both that the 
defendant had knowledge that his or her conduct created a grave 
risk of death to another, and the jury must determine whether the 
conduct evidenced depraved indifference by using an objective 
"reasonable person" standard, rather than using a subjective 
standard looking at the defendant's actual State of mind. Id. at 
1047. The defendant's subjective intent is irrelevant.13 
State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843 (Utah 1992) conclusively 
establishes that intent is not an element of depraved indifference 
homicide. Accord State v. Haston, 846 P. 2d 1276 (Utah 1993) . The 
issue in Vigil was whether Utah recognized the crime of attempted 
depraved indifference homicide. The attempt statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-4-101 (1990), provides that a person is liable if "acting 
with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission 
of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial 
step toward commission of the offense." Subsection (2) provides 
that "conduct does not constitute a substantial step unless it is 
strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the 
offense." The Supreme Court found depraved indifference homicide 
does not include an element of intent, and thus no crime of 
attempted depraved indifference homicide exists in Utah. 
Since depraved indifference homicide does not involve any 
element of intent, the State had no need here to prove intent, by 
13Even the State recognized this. In closing, the prosecutor 
stated "[w]e're not contending, and she's not charged, with 
intending to kill Rocky Christensen." R. 2185 (closing.25). 
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means of prior bad acts or otherwise.14 Reeves v. State, 570 So. 2d 
724, 726 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990) ("The intent exception [to the 
exclusionary rule prohibiting the admission of evidence of 
collateral crimes to prove the guilt of the accused] is simply not 
applicable in a case that requires no specific criminal intent as 
a prerequisite to conviction.") ; Pounds v. United States, 529 A. 2d 
791, 795 n.6 (D.C.App. 1987) (exceptions only applicable when 
affirmative defenses put state of mind in issue or when intent is 
material issue; "because specific intent is irrelevant for incest, 
carnal knowledge, or rape of a minor, appellant's state of mind was 
not at issue") . The prior bad acts evidence in this case was thus 
not admissible to prove intent, because intent was not an element 
of the crime charged. See Wareham, 772 P. 2d at 963 ("evidence may 
be adduced 'to establish any of the constitutive elements of the 
crime . . . ' ") .15 
140f course, where the charged crime requires a showing of 
specific intent, intent is at issue even absent any dispute by 
defendant. E.g. , United States v. Harrod, 856 F.2d 996, 1000-01 
(7th Cir. 1988). 
15Even if intent were an element of the offense, it was not at 
issue here. Ms. Teuscher adamantly denied ever shaking any infant. 
R. 2027 (V9.98), 2063 (v9.134), 2074 (v9.145), 2097 (v9.168), 2123A 
(v9.195). This is not a case where the act is admitted, and the 
relevant question for the jury is the actor's state of mind at the 
time the offense was committed. The question here is whether Ms. 
Teuscher committed the act. If she did, intent follows as a 
necessary incident. See, e.g., United States v. Ring, 513 F.2d 
1001, 1007 (6th Cir. 1975) ("Here, on the contrary, if the act were 
proven, intent would naturally be inferred from the mailing of the 
threatening letters."); People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 299, 61 
N.E. 286, 296 (1901) ("Could proof of any number of repetitions of 
this act add anything to the conclusive inference of criminal 
intent which proof of the act itself affords? Can it be possible 
that in the face of such irrefragable indicia of murderous intent 
it is still necessary or proper to prove the commission of other 
14 
In Utah, prior bad acts to show intent have only been 
admitted when intent was actually at issue. See Shickles, 760 P. 2d 
at 296 (intent and mental state "hotly contested issues"); State v. 
Morrell, 803 P.2d 292, 295 (Utah App. 1990) ("Defendant directly 
challenged the element of intent. He claimed he was only trying to 
collect a debt through somewhat insistent, but not unlawful means. 
Defendant was being tried for aggravated robbery . . . The only 
two controverted elements of the charge were the use of a weapon 
and defendant's intent."); O'Neil, 848 P.2d at 700-701 
(defendant's claim of innocent presence during drug sale properly 
rebutted by prior convictions for drug distribution as they show 
knowledge and intent). 
In United States v. Jenkins, 7 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 1993), 
defendant was charged with distributing LSD. In rebuttal,16 the 
prosecution elicited evidence that the defendant had previously 
similar crimes to establish intent? These questions carry their 
own answers."); McGee v. State 725 S.W.2d 363, 365 (Tex.App. 1987) 
("The State introduced circumstantial evidence of the extraneous 
offense even though appellant's intent could be inferred from the 
act itself."); Baldonado v. State, 745 S.W.2d 491, 496 (Tex.App. 
1988) ("Extraneous offenses are admissible to prove scienter, where 
intent or guilty knowledge is an essential element of the State's 
case and cannot be inferred from the act itself."); Johnson v. 
State, 544 N.E.2d 164, 169 (Ind.App. 1989) (intent was necessary 
incident of battery and abduction); People v. MacDonald, 542 
N.Y.S.2d 42, 43 (A.D. 1989) ("While one of the recognized exception 
to the general rule permits the admission of uncharged crime 
evidence to show intent, such evidence will often be unnecessary, 
and therefore should be precluded even though marginally relevant, 
where intent may be easily inferred from the commission of the act 
itself. ") . 
16Where, as here, the State introduces prior bad acts in its 
case in chief, the prejudice to the defendant is even greater. 
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engaged in the sale of marijuana. The Eighth Circuit reversed, 
finding that defendant's absolute denial of participation in the 
charged crime meant intent was not at issue. The only relevance of 
the evidence was therefore the impermissible propensity inference, 
and the evidence should have been excluded as improper character 
evidence. Id. at 807. 
In United States v. Fierson, 419 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 
1969), defendant was charged with impersonating an FBI agent and 
attempting to commandeer an automobile. The State introduced 
evidence concerning a prior occasion when the defendant demanded an 
automobile under the guise of being an FBI agent. The Seventh 
Circuit reversed, and stated: 
Obviously intent must be an element of the offense to 
justify the admission of this type of evidence. Prior 
criminal acts cannot be proved to show intent when intent 
is not an element of the offense charged. . . . 
However, to justify admission into evidence of 
an accused's prior criminal acts to establish willfulness 
and intent, it is necessary that willfulness amd intent 
be more than merely formal issues in the sense that the 
defendant is entitled to an instruction thereon. When, 
as in this case, the government has ample evidence to 
take the case to the trier of fact for its deliberation, 
a plea of not guilty cannot, by itself, be construed as 
raising such a keen dispute on the issue of willfulness 
and intent so as to justify admission of this type of 
evidence. 
Id. at 1022-3 (cites omitted). See also Thompson v. United States, 
546 A.2d 414, 422 (D.C.App. 1988) ("When a defendant denies 
participation in the conduct which is alleged to constitute the 
crime, intent is ordinarily not a material issue for purposes of 
admitting other crimes evidence."; "where intent is not 
controverted in any meaningful sense, evidence of other crimes to 
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prove intent is so prejudicial per se that it is inadmissible as a 
matter of law"). 
Numerous other cases from other jurisdictions also 
recognize that intent must be at issue before prior bad acts may be 
introduced on that basis. See, e.g., State v. Beasley, 809 F.2d 
1273, 1278 (7th Cir. 1987) (intent at issue where chemist charged 
with obtaining controlled substance for distribution testified that 
the drugs were acquired for legitimate research on vegetables; but 
case affirmed in part and reversed in part due to prejudicial prior 
bad acts evidence); United States v. San Martin, 505 F.2d 918, 
922-3 (5th Cir. 1974) (materiality of issue is one part of four 
part test); Hamilton v. United States, 409 F.2d 928, 930 (5th Cir. 
1969) (fl[W]here the prior offense bears sufficient similarity to 
the one under inquiry and is not too remote in point of time, it is 
admissible as evidence on the issue of the intent with which an act 
was done where intent , as such, is a critical ingredient of the 
offense charged." [emphasis in original] ; prior offense 
inadmissible since there could be no question of motive if 
defendant in fact sold moonshine as charged); United States v. 
Goodwin, 492 F.2d 1141, 1152 (5th Cir. 1974) ("Although intent was 
an element of the crimes charged [conspiracy to import marijuana], 
that issue was never seriously disputed at trial."); United States 
v. Ring, 513 F.2d 1001, 1007 (6th Cir. 1975) (" [W]e conclude the 
admission of the challenged evidence was erroneous for the more 
fundamental reason that intent was not a genuinely contested 
issue."); United States v. Cochran, 546 F.2d 27, 30 (5th Cir. 
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1977) ("Defendant claimed that he had no such intent so that the 
question of defendant's general intent of state of mind at the time 
that the firearms were purchased was clearly put in issue."); 
State v. DeCicco, 435 F.2d 478, 484 (2nd 1970) (Art theft; "[The 
informant]'s story, if believed, leads ineluctably to the 
conclusion that the defendants knew what they were doing, for had 
any of the defendants admitted the facts testified to by [the 
informant] any claim that they were ignorant of the nature of the 
goods or their intended destination for sale to a prospective buyer 
would be patently incredible."); United States v. Soundingsides, 
820 F.2d 1232, 1237 (10th Cir. 1987) (intent not at issue in 
beating death where no specific intent needed to be proven, and 
intent could be inferred from the act itself); McGee v. State, 725 
S.W.2d 362, 364 (Tex.App. 1987) ("Evidence of an extraneous offense 
is admissible to help prove intent only if the intent required for 
a conviction for the primary offense is a contested issue in the 
case."); Castro v. State, 547 So.2d 111, 115 (Fla. 1989) ("The 
record discloses that McKnight's state of mind was never in issue. 
Therefore, testimony to establish his mental state was 
irrelevant."); Landrum v. United States, 559 A.2d 1323, 1326 
(D.C.App. 1989) ("intent must be a genuinely contested matter in 
the case and not merely a formal issue") ; Ford v. State, 514 So. 2d 
1057, 1059 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987) ("In order for the exceptions to 
apply, it is necessary , however, that the accused's intent be 
contested at trial."); 
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The San Martin court noted the inappropriateness of using 
prior bad acts to show intent for crimes involving intent of the 
moment: 
[T]he evidence of prior crimes involving intent of the 
moment are hardly ever probative of later acts involving 
similar split-second intent. Indeed, such prior crimes 
have less to do with the type of specific intent that 
may arise later, as in fraud, than they do with the 
defendant's overall disposition or character; and if 
there is one clear category that is not an exception to 
the general rule against allowing evidence of prior acts, 
it is that which includes "character, disposition, and 
reputation." 
San Martin, 505 F.2d at 923 (quoting Michelson v. United States, 
335 U.S. 469, 475, 69 S. Ct. 213, , 93 L.Ed. 168, (1948)). 
Intent was not at issue, and prior bad acts evidence should not 
have been admitted on that basis. 
2. Lack of accident or mistake was not 
at issue in this case. 
The State's theory of how Rocky's injuries occurred rules 
out the possibility of accident or mistake. The State asserted 
that Rocky was held by the head, and his body was shaken or swung 
back and forth, causing a "dislocation" in Rocky's neck resulting 
in a cessation of cardiac and pulmonary function. See R. 1847 
(v8.55) (Dr. Palmer); 1728 (v7.69) (Dr. Walker); 1611 (v5.191) (Dr. 
Frikke). Dr. Walker unequivocally ruled out accident as a possible 
cause of Rocky's injuries, R. 1733 (v7.74), as did Dr. Palmer. R. 
1861 (v8.69). 
Lack of accident or mistake was not at issue here. Ms. 
Teuscher denied ever shaking Rocky Christensen. R. 2063 (v9.134), 
2074 (v9.145), 2123A (v9.195). The prior bad acts evidence was 
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admitted in the State's case in chief. At that time, the defense 
had presented no evidence concerning accident. When the defense 
presented its case, it still presented no evidence concerning 
accident. Houston v. State, 531 So.2d 598 (Miss. 1988) is similar 
in many ways. Houston was a capital homicide case involving 
charges that the defendant killed her daughter. The State 
introduced evidence of abuse of the daughter by her mother over the 
course of eight years. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the 
conviction and death sentence. The trial court admitted the prior 
abuse evidence solely on the issue of intent, as it related to 
ruling out the possibility of accident. The appellate court 
reasoned: 
[T] he evidence of prior abuse may be received "to negate 
the idea that the injuries were the result of a fall or 
other isolated incident." Here the word "negate" is the 
key. It suggests that the evidence is relevant if there 
has in some manner been a prior effort by the defendant 
to convince the court and jury that the child's injuries 
were the result of a fall or other isolated accident. 
Here they find nothing of the sort. At the time the 
prior abuse evidence was received, Houston had offered no 
evidence whatsoever. In fact, Houston never offered any 
evidence at the guilt phase of the trial, much less 
evidence attempting to show that the injuries Paula had 
received on June 3, 1985, were the result of a fall or 
isolated accident. Perhaps if defense counsel had 
indicated in opening statement that Houston would attempt 
to prove such "isolated accident," we might have a 
different matter, but such is not the case here as 
defense counsel made no opening statement. 
The only thing before the Court which might 
conceivably be taken as forming the predicate is 
Houston's confession. But Houston did not put this 
confession in evidence, Indeed, she objected to it. The 
prosecution may not build up a strawman and then knock it 
down. The prosecution cannot place Houston's confession 
before the jury and then claim this has sufficed to lay 
the predicate for evidence of eight years of prior abuse 
which is not logically relevant to the charge in the 
indictment. 
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. . . If intent is the issue upon which the 
prior abuse evidence is relevant, it follows that the 
prior abuse evidence must reflect an intent to abuse --
an intent of the same felonious nature as is involved in 
the present prosecution. But this begs the question, for 
nothing in the prior abuse evidence reflects upon intent. 
Nothing offered shows any pattern of behavior, differing 
from the spontaneous loss-of-control, fly-off-the-handle 
theory of Houston's confession -- only that the same 
thing may have happened on a number of occasions over the 
years. 
Houston, 531 So. 2d at 606-7. The State has done the same here. Ms 
Teuscher denied shaking Rocky. At no time did she say "I shook 
him, but it was an accident." The State has set up its strawman, 
only to knock it down with extremely prejudicial evidence of 
unrelated, dissimilar, irrelevant instances of conduct that serve 
only to impugn appellant's character. 
In Harvey v. State, 604 P.2d 586 (Alaska 1979) , the trial 
court allowed evidence of prior abuse to a child to show malice and 
intent. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed, finding the central 
issue in the case to be causation rather than intent. The 
defendant admitted spanking the victim, but denied any blows to the 
head. The court further found that no defense of accident or 
mistake was raised, and the evidence was thus inadmissible for that 
purpose. Reversing, the court emphasized the prejudicial nature of 
this type of evidence: 
Evidence of past abusive conduct is often available in 
child abuse cases and strictly speaking is never totally 
irrelevant. However, its relevance often exists only 
because it reflects on the propensity of a past offender 
to continue a pattern of child abuse. This is precisely 
the type of inference Rule 404(b) is intended to prevent. 
For this reason, evidence of past incidents of child 
abuse is generally held to be more prejudicial than 
probative. 
21 
Id. at 590. The question here was whether Ms. Teuscher shook Rocky 
Christensen, causing the injuries that led to his death. Such 
shaking could not have been accidental. Lack of accident was not 
at issue. 
3. Identity was not at issue in this 
case. 
The identity exception in Rule 404(b) is different in 
kind than the other exceptions. As one court has noted: 
The identity exception has a much more limited 
scope; it is used either in conjunction with some other 
basis for admissibility or synonymously with modus 
operandi. A prior or subsequent crime or other incident 
is not admissible for this purpose merely because it is 
similar, but only if it bears such a high degree of 
similarity as to mark it as the handiwork of the accused. 
Goodwin, 492 F.2d at 1154 (footnote omitted) . This court has 
formulated the inquiry as whether the defendant's acts are "so 
unique as to constitute a signature." State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4, 6 
(Utah App. 1990) (quoting Younablood v. Sullivan, 52 Or.App. 173, 
628 P. 2d 400, 402 (1981) . None of the bad acts evidence introduced 
by the State comes even close to meeting this standard. The only 
similarities between the acts are that they involve appellant and 
her conduct towards children. No uniqueness is present. 
The only possible question with respect to identity was 
whether perhaps one of Ms. Teuscher's daughters might have been 
responsible for Rocky's injuries. The only other non-children in 
the home were Ms. Teuscher's high school age daughters. It was 
undisputed that they did not touch Rocky. R. 881 (v2.184) (Amy 
Teuscher denies touching Rocky or seeing anyone else touch him); 
993 (v2.236) (Kathy Teuscher denies touching Rocky or seeing anyone 
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else touch him) . Ms. Teuscher was the only other possibility. She 
likewise testified that her daughters did not touch Rocky. R. 
2086-7 (v9.157-8). 
Austin Marston's broken leg was the only prior bad act 
evidence concerning any type of injury to a child under Ms. 
Teuscher's care. To the extent there may have been some question 
concerning the Teuscher daughters' involvement in the injury to 
Rocky, the Marston incident could have had some limited probative 
value in showing that Ms. Teuscher was responsible. Significantly, 
the State did not rule out the possibility that Amy or Kathy 
Teuscher may have been responsible for Austin Marston's broken leg. 
Cf. R. 1314 (v4.169) (testimony from investigating officer Trost 
that one of Ms Teuscher's daughters may have dropped the child). 
Detective Trost never interviewed Ms. Teuscher's daughters. R. 
1330-1 (v4.185-6). The State closed its investigation and listed 
the cause of injury as accidental. R. 1333-4 (v4.188-9). 
The State did not prove that any wrongdoing occurred, or 
who may have been responsible. Absent a showing that Ms. Teuscher 
was responsible and that wrongdoing occurred, evidence concerning 
Austin Marston's broken leg had no probative value (or limited 
probative value at best). That was the conclusion of the police, 
and nothing was offered to indicate why that conclusion may have 
been incorrect. 
Identity was not at issue here. The Marston incident 
clarified nothing, and served no purpose save to impugn Ms. 
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Teuscher's character. This is, of course, an improper purpose for 
this evidence. Rule 404(b). 
Other bad act evidence offered by the State has no 
relation to identity at all. For example, the testimony concerning 
children in closets may indicate that Ms. Teuscher put children in 
closets on some occasions and therefore is more likely to have done 
so on other occasions. However, this says nothing about who, if 
anyone, may have been responsible for killing Rocky Christensen. 
At best, this is pure propensity/disposition/character evidence 
proscribed by Rule 404(b). 
Admitting prior bad acts to show identity when identity 
is not in issue is reversible error. Cox, 787 P. 2d at 6. This 
case has nothing in common with the only Utah case where prior bad 
act evidence was allowed to show identity. In State v. Johnson, 
748 P.2d 1069, 1074-5 (Utah 1987), identity evidence was 
problematic. The only eyewitness was only "70% certain" of the 
identification made. Testimony from a different store clerk 
concerning a similar check passing incident was thus necessary for 
purposes of identification, and properly admitted. Here, there is 
no such question of identity, and the prior bad acts evidence 
should have been excluded. 
Cases from other jurisdictions are in accord that 
identity must be in dispute before prior bad acts may be introduced 
for that purpose. See United States v. Park, 525 F.2d 1279, 1284 
(5th Cir. 1976) ("there is no indication in the record that 
identity was a material issue"; reversed on 404(b) grounds); 
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United States v. Maestas, 554 F.2d 834, 837 (8th Cir. 1976) ("In 
the absence of any eyewitness identification, identity was very 
much in issue."), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 972, 97 S.Ct. 2936, 53 
L.Ed.2d 1070 (1977); Bowden v. State, 538 So.2d 1226, 1239 (Ala. 
1988) (consolidated case; in one case where identity was in issue, 
prior bad acts were properly admissible for that purpose; in other 
case where identity not in issue, prior bad acts evidence could not 
come in) ; McGee, 725 S.W.2d at 365 (issue of identity is raised by 
alibi defense); Johnson v. State, 544 N.E.2d 164, 169 (Ind.App. 
1989) (identity not at issue where assailant and victim were 
acquainted for eight years). 
4. Similarity in Ms. Teuscher's 
responses to accusations is not a 
proper basis for admission of prior 
bad acts evidence. 
The State specifically offered the Marston broken leg 
evidence in part to show similarity in Ms. Teuscher's response to 
accusations. See R. 54-6 (State's memo on motion in limine): 
The entire scenario surrounding the broken leg suffered 
by Austin Marston is relevant to this case, since it 
mirrors the Defendant's behavior following commission of 
the acts that killed Rocky Christensen. . . . The 
fact that she abused another infant in her care, lied to 
others about it, and that the medical evidence 
establishes that her accidental explanation of that 
injury is not consistent with the evidence is compelling 
evidence pointing to her being the killer of Rocky 
Christensen. She acted with knowledge that what she did 
was likely to result in his death and immediately 
necessitated a "cover-up" of what really happened. 
This theory is improper. In State v. Featherson, 781 P. 2d 424, 428 
(Utah 198 9), the Supreme Court resoundingly rejected a similar ploy 
to show that defendant interposed common defenses to prior charges. 
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The State also had its medical experts testify to the 
significance of evolving or changing explanations as they relate to 
making a diagnosis of child abuse. E.g., R. 1715-6 (v7.56-7) (Dr. 
Marion Walker), 1734 (v7.75) (Dr. Walker), R. 1269 (v4.124) (Dr. 
Karen Hansen), 1860-1 (v8.68-9) (Dr. Palmer), 2259 (closing.100) 
(prosecution emphasizes this evidence in rebuttal portion of 
closing) . This evidence runs afoul of State v. Rimmasch, 775 P. 2d 
388 (Utah 1989) (expert witnesses may not comment on truthfulness 
of a person's statements on a particular occasion). The doctors 
are commenting directly on the credibility of Ms. Teuscher when she 
proffered her explanations. 
These errors require reversal. The evidence here was 
almost entirely circumstantial. The State's repeated references to 
the similarity of Ms. Teuscher's "evolving explanations" was 
devastating to her credibility, and could well have tipped the 
scales towards conviction. 
POINT II. EVEN IF THE PRIOR BAD ACTS EVIDENCE WAS 
ADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE 404(b), IT SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN EXCLUDED UNDER RULE 4 03. 
In Shickles, 76 0 P. 2d at 2 95, the Supreme Court quoted E. 
Cleary, McCormick on Evidence, § 190, at 565 (3d ed. 1984) for the 
factors to be evaluated in the balancing process: 
In deciding whether the danger of unfair prejudice 
and the like substantially outweighs the 
incremental probative value, a variety of matters 
must be considered, including the strength of the 
evidence as to the commission of the other crime, 
the similarities between the crimes, the interval 
of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the 
need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative 
proof, and the degree to which the evidence 
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probably will rouse the jury to overmastering 
hostility. 
Shickles, 760 P.2d at 295; accord Featherson, 781 P.2d at 426; 
O'Neil, 848 P. 2d at 701. These factors will be addressed in order. 
A. STRENGTH OF OTHER BAD ACT EVIDENCE. 
Obviously, a conviction of a prior crime is the strongest 
form of prior bad act evidence. Here, the State had no such 
convictions to rely on. The evidence the State did offer is 
troubling. With respect to the Austin Marston broken leg incident, 
the State's evidence was completely circumstantial. 
Dr. Karen Hansen, a member of the child protection team 
at Primary Children's Hospital, testified that in her opinion the 
broken leg was the result of child abuse, R. 1259 (v4.114), but 
later admitted that the broken leg could have resulted from the 
child flipping out of Ms. Teuscher's arms while on a diaper 
changing table. R. 1277 (v4.132). The State closed its 
investigation of this incident without bringing any charges, and 
listed the cause of injury as accidental. R. 1333-4 (v4.188-9). 
This evidence is weak at best. It is unclear whether this incident 
involved any wrongdoing at all, and its not even certain whether 
Ms. Teuscher was responsible if there was wrongdoing. Cases hold 
that prior bad acts evidence is inadmissible unless the State can 
prove that the defendant was responsible. E.g., McGee, 725 S.W.2d 
at 365 ("Because the State was unable to prove clearly that the 
appellant committed the extraneous offense, it was improper to 
admit evidence concerning it for any purpose."). 
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Given the weak nature of the evidence concerning the 
broken leg, it should have been excluded. Its minimal probative 
value was clearly outweighed by its prejudice to Ms. Teuscher in 
inflaming the jury, confusing the issues, and presenting an 
improper basis for returning a guilty verdict. 
Evidence concerning incidents other than Marston's broken 
leg17 was stronger, but that evidence fails on relevancy grounds. 
No injury was even shown. Overall, the evidence presented by the 
State to show prior bad acts was not very strong, and should have 
been excluded as more prejudicial than probative. 
B. SIMILARITY. 
Prior bad acts are admitted more readily when the are 
more closely similar to the charged incident. There is almost no 
similarity between the prior bad acts introduced by the State and 
the crime with which Ms. Teuscher was charged. Children in 
closets, hair pulling, baby tossing, a broken leg, and a thumbs-
over-the-eyes headholding homicide do not at first blush exhibit 
any similarity at all. The only similarity between these acts is 
they tend to impugn Ms. Teuscher's character, a forbidden use under 
Rule 404(b). 
C. REMOTENESS. 
The prior bad acts introduced by the State ranged from 6 
months prior to Rocky's death (shaking, hair pulling testified to 
by the Wilsons), to just over a year prior (Austin Marston broken 
17E.g., closet incidents, the Wilsons' testimony re: shaking 
child, pulling by hair, and lifting over railing, and Ms. Merrill's 
testimony re: throwing baby. 
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leg), to about 4 years prior (closet episodes [Jody Merrill, Nora 
Cook, Det. Jill Candland]; baby tossing episode [Jody Merrill]). 
These occurrences are hardly proximal to the death of Rocky 
Christensen. 
In Featherson, 781 P.2d at 43 0, the Utah Supreme Court 
noted that M[t]he relevant inquiry is whether the other acts have 
'clearly probative value with respect to the intent of the accused 
at the time of the offense charged.'", quoting United States v. 
Scott, 701 F.2d 1340, 1345-46 (11th Cir.), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 
856, 104 S.Ct. 175, 78 L.Ed.2d 158 (1983). 
In Barnes v. Commonwealth, 794 S.W.2d 165, 169 (Ky. 1990) 
the Kentucky Supreme Court noted: 
Acts of physical violence, remote in time, prove little 
with regard to intent , motive, plan or scheme; have 
little relevance other than establishment of a general 
disposition to commit such acts; and the prejudice far 
outweighs any probative value in such evidence. Taken in 
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the 
testimony of Daphne Pritchard did no more than establish 
that on two occasions long before the date of the alleged 
murder, appellant physically abused his wife. 
In Barnes, the prior acts occurred four and seven years prior to 
the murder. Here, the acts were too remote to have any bearing on 
appellant's intent at the time she allegedly lost her impulse 
control and shook Rocky to death. See also State v. Humphrey, 3 81 
So. 2d 813, 815 (La. 1980) (abuse of same victim 10 months prior to 
charged instance was too remote to be relevant, and is thus 
inadmissible). The acts here were too remote to have any bearing 
on any material issue, and should have been excluded. 
D. EFFICACY OF ALTERNATE PROOF. 
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In Morrell, 803 P. 2d at 296, this court allowed other bad 
acts evidence where "no effective alternative proof was available." 
Here, the State had all the proof it needed. Its medical experts 
testified that severe shaking occurred, thus eliminating accident 
as a possibility if the State's theory is believed by the jury. As 
previously stated, identity was not seriously disputed; Ms. 
Teuscher was the only real possibility. Finally, intent was not an 
element of depraved indifference homicide, so no proof was needed 
on this issue. 
In Featherson, the Utah Supreme Court noted: 
The prosecutorial need for the admitted evidence was 
insignificant. There was sufficient evidentiary proof to 
show that all the elements of the charged crimes had been 
satisfied. Introduction of all prior misconduct and 
convictions was unnecessary. 
781 P.2d at 431. 
In State v. Holder, 694 P.2d 583 (Utah 1984) the Utah 
Supreme Court reversed a conviction for motor vehicle theft where 
the trial court admitted evidence of a robbery 2 0 minutes prior to 
defendant's arrest. The court found the evidence relevant to show 
possession and cooperation between defendant and his companion, but 
nevertheless ruled that the evidence should have been excluded as 
being more prejudicial than probative. The court noted: 
The inclusion of evidence of the robbery of 
Childers twenty minutes before Holder and Perez were 
arrested by the highway patrolman was relevant to show 
possession of the stolen car and cooperation in that 
possession between Perez and Holder. Yet this evidence 
was only cumulative on that issue. Possession had been 
shown already by the testimony of the arresting highway 
patrolman. Cooperation, or at least leadership in 
control of the vehicle by Holder, could be inferred from 
Holder's possession of two weapons upon his arrest. 
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The merely cumulative character of the robbery 
evidence on the element of knowledge and intent regarding 
the theft charge is significant because it highlights the 
limited value this evidence has when weighed against the 
substantial possibility that a jury would be prejudiced 
by evidence of Holder's commission of another crime. Such 
evidence of the commission of other crimes must be used 
with extreme caution because of the prejudicial effect it 
may have on the finder of fact. See State v. Kappas, 100 
Utah 274, 278, 114 P.2d 205, 207 (1941); State v. 
Anderton, 81 Utah 320, 323-24, 17 P.2d 917, 918 (1933); 
State v. McGowan, 66 Utah 223, 226-28, 241 P. 314, 315-16 
(1925) . 
Holder, 694 P. 2d at 584. Here, the prior bad acts evidence is 
similarly cumulative. The State's medical experts were unrebutted 
in their testimony that the shaking was deliberate in nature and 
could not be characterized as accidental. Thus, intent and lack of 
accident or mistake were already shown. With respect to identity, 
the only other non-children in the home were Ms. Teuscher's high 
school age daughters. It was undisputed that they did not touch 
Rocky. See R. 881 (v2.184) (Amy Teuscher, age 18, denies touching 
Rocky or seeing anyone else touch him); 993 (v2.236) (Kathy 
Teuscher denies touching Rocky or seeing anyone else touch him) . 
Ms. Teuscher was the only other possibility. She likewise 
testified that her daughters did not touch Rocky. R. 2086-7 
(v9.157-8). To whatever extent the prior bad acts showed identity, 
this evidence was merely cumulative and should have been excluded. 
For cases from other jurisdictions, see DeVore v. United 
States, 368 F.2d 396, 398 and n.4 (9th Cir. 1966) (reversed case, 
noting cumulative nature of evidence in case "where the minute peg 
of relevancy will be entirely obscured by the dirty linen hung upon 
it," quoting State v. Goebel, 218 P.2d 300, 306 (Wash. 1950)); 
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McGee, 725 S.W.2d at 364, 365 ("Adequate evidence of appellant's 
intent had already been introduced."; "The State introduced 
circumstantial evidence of the extraneous offense even though 
appellant's identity had already been proven adequately."); State 
v. Edison, 569 A.2d 657, 668 (Md. 1990) ("in [the trial court's] 
judicious determination of the probative effect of the evidence 
versus the prejudicial impact, he must weigh carefully the 
necessity for and probativeness of the evidence concerning the 
collateral criminal acts against the untoward prejudice which was 
likely to be the consequence of its admission"); Johnson, 544 
N.E.2d at 169 ("little, if any, probative value" where intent and 
identity not seriously at issue). 
The evidence here was unnecessary, and should have been 
excluded. 
E. PREJUDICE. 
The prejudicial potential of prior bad acts evidence is 
so patent it hardly requires explication. As Justice Stewart noted 
in his concurrence in State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1178 (Utah 
1982) : 
The natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunal --
whether judge or jury -- is to give excessive weight to 
the vicious record of crime thus exhibited, and either 
allow it to bear to strongly on the present charge, or to 
take the proof of it as justifying a condemnation 
irrespective of guilt of the present charge. 
Quoting 1 Wigmore on Evidence, § 194 (3rd ed. 1940) at 646. 
As stated in State v. Wilson, 513 A.2d 620, 638 (Conn. 
1986) : 
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Without going into further detail, we may 
fairly characterize the evidence as portraying the victim 
and her sister as having been abused on numerous 
occasions, not always by defendant. The natural 
inclination of any normal juror would be to hold someone 
responsible, and the trial court should have taken 
special care to minimize the prejudice inherent in this 
type of evidence. . . . The trial court clearly abused 
its discretion in admitting evidence of injuries, such as 
those to the victim's ribs and kidney, in the absence of 
any showing that they had been inflicted by the 
defendant."). 
See also United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751, 763 (5th 
Cir. 1974) ("All that we demand of trial courts and litigants in 
this seemingly complex area of criminal jurisprudence is that they 
deal in reason, not categories. The treasured principles 
underlying the rule against admitting evidence of other crimes 
should be relaxed only when such evidence is genuinely needed and 
would be genuinely relevant."; case of defendant John McDuffie 
reversed on 404(b) grounds), reversed on other grounds, 425 U.S. 
435, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976) (only as to defendant 
Miller); Goodwin, 492 F.2d at 1152 (balanced against the total 
absence of need for the evidence of appellant Goodwin's subsequent 
conduct to show intent, this case poses a dramatic example of the 
kind of prejudice the rule against admitting other-crime evidence 
was designed to prevent."). 
" [I] f the government can do without such evidence, 
fairness dictates that it should; but if the evidence is essential 
to obtain a conviction, it may come in." United States v. Pollock, 
926 F.2d 1044, 1048 (11th Cir.), cert, denied. U.S. , 112 
S.Ct. 593, 116 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991). 
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In total, the prior bad acts evidence should have been 
excluded. Ms. Teuscher is likely to obtain a better result absent 
this prejudicial evidence. The State's case was entirely 
circumstantial, and conviction on retrial is by no means a 
certainty. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
STATEMENTS MADE WITHOUT BENEFIT OF 
MIRANDA WARNINGS. 
Officers spoke to Ms. Teuscher at her home at about 
3:00 p.m. on December 17, 1991. R. 1152, 1153-4 (v4.7,8-9). A 
short time later, officers requested that Ms. Teuscher go to the 
police station for questioning. R. 1154 (v4.9). Ms. Teuscher and 
her daughters were questioned at the police station that same 
evening beginning at about 6:00 p.m. Id. Officers did not advise 
Ms. Teuscher of her Miranda rights. R. 1067-8 (v3.113-4). 
Officers also questioned Ms. Teuscher on December 23, 1991 and 
January 3, 1992. R. 1168, 1170 (v4.23,25). They advised her of 
her Miranda rights at each of these sessions. Id. Officers 
requested that she return to the police station for questioning on 
January 6. R. 1172 (v4.27). Officers did not advise her of her 
Miranda rights at that session. See Exhibit 21; R. 1068 (v3.114). 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution guarantees that a defendant shall not be 
"compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself." To secure this fundamental right, Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), established procedural 
safeguards to be followed in a custodial interrogation. The 
prescribed procedures require a warning that the defendant has 
the right to remain silent and the right to have an attorney 
present during questioning. Id. at 444. 
State v. Wood, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 17 (Utah 1993) . 
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Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides 
that "[t]he accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself." 
A Miranda warning is required prior to any custodial 
interrogation pursuant to the Fifth Amendment and Article I, 
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. See Wood, 22 9 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 17-18. Where officers fail to give the required Miranda 
warnings prior to a custodial interrogation, an accused's 
subsequent statements must be suppressed. Wood, 22 9 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 17; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
In State v. Wood, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. at 17-18, the Utah 
Supreme Court reaffirmed the four-part test for determining whether 
an individual is "in custody" for Miranda purposes which it had set 
forth in Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983) . 
In so doing, the Court clarified that the decision in Carner was 
based on Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution and that 
United States Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Carner had no 
impact on "in custody" determinations under the Utah 
Constitution.18 
In reaffirming Carner, the Utah Supreme Court recognized 
that 
Subsequent to our decision in Carner, the United States 
Supreme Court issued two decisions holding that a 
custodial interrogation exists when a suspect is under 
18In Wood, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18, the Court recognized that 
it was not required to apply the standards for determining whether 
a custodial interrogation occurred which were enunciated in 
California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983), and Berkemer v. 
McCartv, 468 U.S. 420, 441-2 (1984). 
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formal arrest or has a reasonable belief that he or she 
is in police custody of a type associated with formal 
arrest. 
Wood, 22 9 Utah Adv. Rep. at 17. Nevertheless, the Court chose to 
retain the focus on individual circumstances rather than the 
formality of arrest. Id. at 18. The Court stated: 
Carner recognized that even though a suspect may not be 
formally under arrest, he may still be "in custody" for 
practical purposes. In essence, Carner emphasizes the 
importance of individual circumstance in determining 
whether a person is "in custody" for Miranda purposes, 
rather than the formality of an arrest that can be 
manipulated to circumvent the procedural safeguards of 
Miranda. 
Wood, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18. 
The four Carner factors are: 
(1) the site of the interrogation; (2) whether the 
investigation focused on the accused; (3) whether the 
objective indicia of arrest were present; and (4) the 
length and form of interrogation. 
Carner, 664 P. 2d at 1171. The test is an objective one; the 
"relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position 
would have understood his situation." State v. Mirquet, 844 P.2d 
at 997. In addition to affirming the four-part Carner test, the 
Supreme Court noted that "[t]he absence of 'coercive or compulsive 
strategy on the officer's part' evidences a noncustodial 
interrogation that 'does not suggest the type of abuse Miranda is 
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intended to prevent.'"19 Wood, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. at 17, quoting 
State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 391 (Utah 1986). 
This Court has applied the four-part earner test and 
concluded that the defendant was in custody on many occasions. 
See, e.g., State v. Mirquet, 844 P.2d at 997-1001; State v. 
Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1105-07 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 817 
P.2d 327 (Utah 1991) , cert, denied, U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 1282, 117 
L.Ed.2d 507 (1992); State v. Snvder, 860 P.2d 351, 357 (Utah App. 
1993) . 
In the present case, officers questioned Ms. Teuscher on 
December 17, 1991 and January 6, 1992 without advising her of her 
"Miranda" rights. Both interviews occurred at the police station 
after officers had requested that Ms. Teuscher go to the station 
for questioning. R. 1154, 1172 (v4.9,27). Because she was 
subjected to custodial interrogation without being advised of her 
Miranda rights, statements made by Ms. Teuscher at each 
interrogation should have been suppressed. See Miranda, 3 84 U.S. 
at 444; Wood, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. at 17. 
A. OFFICERS SUBJECTED MS. TEUSCHER TO 
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION ON DECEMBER 17. 
A review of the earner factors demonstrates that officers 
subjected Ms. Teuscher to custodial interrogation on December 17. 
19The Supreme Court recognized that in State v. Sampson, 808 
P.2d 1100, 1105 (Utah App. 1991), this Court added a fifth factor--
"'whether the defendant came to the place of interrogation freely 
and willingly.711 Wood, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26 n.3, quoting 
Sampson, 808 P. 2d at 1105. The Supreme Court pointed out, however, 
that this "fifth factor" falls within the objective indicia of 
arrest and therefore is not truly an additional factor." Wood, 229 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 26 n.3. 
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The first Carner factor focuses on the site of the 
interrogation. In the present case, officers interrogated 
Ms. Teuscher at the police station after interviewing her at her 
home earlier in the day. R. 1152, 1154 (v4.7,9). While 
questioning at the police station "lends itself to a finding of 
custody", "that fact alone is not conclusive." Sampson, 808 P.2d 
at 1105. In this case, earlier in the day officers had gone to 
Ms. Teuscher's home to talk to her, then telephoned her and 
requested that she go to the police station. Under such 
circumstances, where three hours after officers talked to 
Ms. Teuscher at her home, they were again interrogating her at the 
police station, the site of the interrogation weighs heavily for a 
determination of custody. 
The second factor, whether the investigation focused on 
Ms. Teuscher, also weighs in favor of an "in custody" 
determination. At the time of the questioning, officers knew that 
the child had died while in the "sole custody" of Ms, Teuscher. R. 
1164 (v4.19). Detective Candland also knew that the referral on 
the case had come from Primary Children's Medical Center and that 
" [t]here was some concern because this was the second death at the 
daycare center." R. 1150-51 (v4.5-6). After talking with Jerri at 
her home, and before the 6:00 p.m. interview at the police station, 
Detective Candland talked to the medical examiner, a detective 
investigating the broken leg incident and possibly the detective 
who had investigated the previous death at the center, and Joanna 
Murphy from Social Services. R. 1154 (v4.9) . In addition, she was 
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present at the autopsy and learned "that there was a pooling of the 
blood at the base of the brain" for which the medical examiner had 
no explanation. R. 1155 (v4.10). 
Detective Candland also apparently knew that the injury 
"most likely resulted from some sort of trauma that didn't appear 
to be natural," that the hospital "considered this suspicious," 
that someone at the hospital had a conversation with Ms. Teuscher 
which apparently raised his or her suspicions, and that 
Ms. Teuscher "had been reported for child neglect, cruelty to a 
child, and suspicious death and then this incident." R. 1156 
(v4.ll) .20 
Although Detective Candland claimed that Ms. Teuscher was 
just a witness, she "believed that Ms. Teuscher had unique 
information about [the circumstances and cause of Rocky 
Christensen's death] because the child was in her sole custody 
during that day." R. 1164 (v4.19). The detective also believed 
that the death was accidental, unintentional or a bizarre natural 
trauma. R. 1165 (v4.20). 
As was the case in Sampson, " [n] othing in the record 
suggests other suspects were sought or questioned, or other leads 
pursued" before the December 17 interrogation. See Sampson, 808 
P. 2d at 1105. In the present case, although the officers may have 
not been absolutely certain what, if any crime had occurred, they 
were conducting an investigation into the child's death and had 
20Detective Candland acknowledged that she had testified at the 
preliminary hearing that she was aware of this information prior to 
the December 17 questioning. R. 1156 (v4.11). 
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focused that investigation on Ms. Teuscher. R. 1156, 1164 
(v4.11,19) . This is similar to the circumstances in Sampson where 
the officers had focused their investigation on Sampson, even 
though they did not know what, if any, crime had occurred when they 
questioned him. 
Because officers had focused their investigation on 
Ms. Teuscher, the second factor weighs in favor of a conclusion 
that she was in custody. 
The third factor, whether objective indicia of arrest 
were present, also tips in favor of a determination that 
Ms. Teuscher was in custody. In Mirguet, 844 P. 2d at 999, this 
Court recognized that "readied handcuffs, locked doors or drawn 
guns" are not the only indicia of arrest and that being "isolated 
in a patrol vehicle with an officer accusing [one] of a crime" also 
might indicate that an individual is in custody. In addition, 
"whether a defendant came to the place of interrogation freely and 
willingly" "falls within the objective indicia of arrest." Wood, 
229 Utah Adv. Rep. at 2 6 n.3. 
In the present case, officers "requested" by phone less 
than three hours after talking with her at her home that 
Ms. Teuscher go to the police station for further questioning. 
Although the record offers little information as to whether 
Ms. Teuscher went to the police station "freely and willingly," it 
demonstrates that she went there only at the direction of the 
officers. Although the officers allowed Ms. Teuscher to leave at 
the conclusion of the interview, while she was in the interrogation 
40 
room, she was isolated from others and controlled by the officers. 
While this factor does not weigh as strongly for a determination 
that Ms. Teuscher was in custody as the first two factors, it 
nevertheless supports that conclusion. 
Finally, the fourth factor, the length and form of the 
investigation, provides little support in determining the custody 
issue. While the questioning was not unduly long, it focused on 
Ms. Teuscher as the only person having custody of the baby when he 
died. Under the totality of circumstances, Ms. Teuscher was 
subjected to custodial interrogation during the December 17 
session. Failure to advise Ms. Teuscher of her Miranda rights 
prior to questioning requires that her statements during the 
December 17 evening interview be suppressed. 
B. THE OFFICERS SUBJECTED MS. TEUSCHER TO 
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION WITHOUT ADVISING 
HER OF HER MIRANDA RIGHTS ON JANUARY 6, 
1992. 
A review of the earner factors as they relate to the 
January 6, 1992 interrogation demonstrates that under the totality 
of circumstances, officers subjected Ms. Teuscher to custodial 
interrogation at that time. 
The first factor, the site of the interrogation, weighs 
in favor of a determination of custody. See Sampson, 808 P.2d at 
1105; see also discussion supra at 38. Ms. Teuscher had gone to 
the police station for questioning on December 23, 1991 and 
January 3, 1992. R. 1168, 1169, 1170 (v4.23,24,25). At each of 
those interrogations, officers advised Ms. Teuscher of her Miranda 
rights. Id. At the January 3 interrogation, officers told 
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Ms. Teuscher that there had to be an explanation for the baby's 
death, and that Ms. Teuscher's explanation that the baby hit his 
head when dropped was not consistent with his injuries. R. 1171-2 
(v4.26-7). The January 3 interview concluded with arrangements 
being made for Ms. Teuscher to return to the police station on 
January 6 to record what she said and demonstrated on January 3. 
R. 1172, 1174 (v4.27,29). Under these circumstances, where she 
returned to the police station at the insistence of the officers 
after having been told that her statement was not making sense in 
terms of the baby's injuries, the site of the interrogation weighs 
in favor of a custody determination. 
The second factor, whether the investigation focused on 
Ms. Teuscher, also weighs in favor of an "in custody" 
determination. In addition to the information known on 
December 17, by January 6, officers had concluded that Ms. Teuscher 
had caused the baby's death, either accidentally or intentionally. 
R. 1165 (v4.20). Officers also knew that Ms. Teuscher had given 
different explanations for the injuries, and that at least one of 
those explanations was not consistent with the type of injury 
sustained by the baby. R. 1171 (v4.26) The investigation focused 
on Ms. Teuscher by January 6. 
The third factor, whether objective indicia of arrest 
were present, also lends itself to a determination that 
Ms. Teuscher was in custody. She went to the police station at the 
insistence of officers only three days after the third interview by 
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officers. R. 1171-2 (v4.26-7). Although officers did not escort 
her to the station, they clearly expected her to go there. Id. 
Finally, the fourth factor, the length and form of the 
investigation, also lends itself to a determination that 
Ms. Teuscher was in custody. The January 6 interrogation was 
longer and the questioning more intense than the December 17 
session. The officers had confronted Ms. Teuscher on January 3 
with the fact that "something had happened to Rocky Christensen" 
and that Rocky's injury "wasn't consistent with her story." R. 
1179 (v4.34). The officers had also told Teuscher that Rocky 
hitting his head on the rocking chair was not consistent with his 
injury. Id. According to the officers, Ms. Teuscher then "finally 
admit[ted] that around 9:30/10:00 that she had dropped the baby. 
Id. Officers then told Teuscher to return on January 6 to record 
her demonstration of how she dropped the baby. R. 1172 (v4.27). 
On January 6, the officer told Teuscher that they were 
videotaping her demonstration and would show it to the medical 
examiner and prosecutors to determine whether dropping the child 
was a possible cause of death. R. 1175 (v4.30). Under these 
circumstances, the questioning had shifted from investigatory to 
accusatory, demonstrating the custodial nature of this 
interrogation. 
Under the totality of circumstances, Ms. Teuscher was 
subjected to custodial interrogation on January 6. Her statements 
taken without being advised of her Miranda rights should not have 
been admitted. Wood, 22 9 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18. 
43 
C. ADMISSION OF THE STATEMENTS REQUIRES A 
NEW TRIAL. 
The traditional rule as to admissibility of coerced 
confessions was that it is 
axiomatic that a defendant in a criminal case is deprived 
of due process of law if his conviction is founded, in 
whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without 
regard for the truth or falsity of the confession, Rogers 
v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 81 S.Ct. 735, 5 L.Ed.2d 760, 
and even though there is ample evidence aside from the 
confession to support the conviction. Malinski v. New 
York, 324 U.S. 401, 65 S. Ct. 781, 89 L.Ed. 1029; Stroble 
v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 72 S.Ct. 599, 96 L.Ed. 872; 
Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 78 S.Ct. 844, 2 L.Ed.2d 
975. 
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376, 84 S.Ct. 1774, , 12 L.Ed.2d 
908, 915 (1964). 
In Fulminante v. Arizona, 499 U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 1246, 
113 L.Ed.2d 302, reh. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2067, 114 L.Ed.2d 472 
(1991), the Supreme Court retreated from this established rule of 
law and held, with four justices dissenting, that admission of 
coerced statements is subject to a harmless error analysis. Id. at 
, 113 L.Ed.2d at 329-33 (per Rehnquist, C. J., joined by 
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Scalia). 
As a result of Fulminante, admission of coerced 
statements is now subject to a harmless error analysis under 
federal law. Ms. Teuscher's statements were inadmissible, and 
should have been suppressed. Failure to suppress her statements 
was prejudicial. Ms. Teuscher is entitled to a new trial. 
Because a federal constitutional right is implicated, as 
a matter of federal law Ms. Teuscher is entitled to a new trial 
unless the State shows the error is harmless beyond a reasonable 
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doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, , 
17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-11, reh. denied, 386 U.S. 987, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 
L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (requiring "beneficiary of a constitutional 
error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained 
of did not contribute to the verdict obtained"); State v. Velarde, 
734 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah 1986) (citing Chapman). 
The State used the statements of Ms. Teuscher primarily 
to demonstrate how her story had changed or evolved. This 
dovetailed into the State's theory that the "cover-ups" for the 
Marston broken leg and the Rocky Christensen fatality are identical 
and show intent, lack of accident or mistake, and identity. As 
explained in Point I.A.4, supra at 25, this argument is improper 
under Featherson. The admission of Ms. Teuscher's statements 
compounds this error and exacerbates the prejudice to appellant. 
As a matter of state constitutional law, this Court 
should hold that there can be no harmless error when a statement 
obtained in violation of the accused's rights under Miranda is 
admitted at trial. 
Until Fulminante was decided in 1991, introduction of 
involuntary or coerced statements into evidence necessitated that 
the defendant be given a new trial. As expressed in Justice 
White's Section III dissenting opinion in Fulminante21 at 113 
21Each of the four sections of the Court's opinion contained 
a different majority. White (joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and 
Stevens) wrote the opinion of the Court in Sections I 
(introduction), II (confession was coerced), and IV (facts don't 
show harmless error), and a dissent in Section III (harmless error 
analysis should be inapplicable to coerced confessions). Rehnguist 
(joined by O'Connor) wrote a dissent in Sections I (confession not 
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L.Ed.2d at 317-22, the adoption of the harmless error doctrine to 
erroneously admitted coerced confessions is contrary to established 
United States Supreme Court precedent. When the Supreme Court 
first declared that constitutional error may be subject to harmless 
error analysis in Chapman v. California, it expressly noted: 
our prior cases have indicated that there are some 
constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their 
infraction can never be treated as harmless error,8 
8See, e.g. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 78 S.Ct. 
844, 2 L.Ed.2d 975 (coerced confession); ... 
Id. at 23 and n.8, 87 S.Ct. at and n.8, 17 L.Ed.2d at 710 and 
n.8. Supreme Court cases since Chapman have been to the same 
effect. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 483, 92 S.Ct. 619, , 
30 L.Ed.2d 618, 624 (1972); Mincev v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398, 
98 S.Ct. 2408, , 57 L.Ed.2d 290, 303-4 (1978); New Jersey v. 
Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459, 99 S.Ct. 1292, , 59 L.Ed.2d 501, 510 
(1979); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 n.6, 106 S.Ct. 3101, , 
92 L.Ed.2d 460, 470 n.6 (1986). 
Prior to the decision in Fulminante, the Utah Court of 
Appeals implicitly recognized that improper admission of coerced 
statements is not subject to harmless error analysis. In Sampson, 
the Court of Appeals stated "'[t]he fifth amendment exclusionary 
rule is clearly dictated by the Constitution and is the only 
possible means of protecting the values underlying the privilege 
coerced) and III (facts show harmless error), and the opinion of 
the Court in Section II (harmless error analysis applicable to 
admission of coerced confessions) . Scalia joined in Sections I and 
II of White's opinion, and Sections II and III of Rehnquist's. 
Kennedy joined in Sections I and IV of White's opinion. Kennedy 
and Souter joined in Sections I and II of Rehnquist's opinion. 
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against self-incrimination." Id. at 1112 (quoting M. Gardner, The 
Emerging Good Faith Exception to the Miranda Rule -- A Critique, 3 5 
Hastings L.J. 429, 466 (1984)). 
Even if the United States Supreme Court has retreated 
from this position, Utah's constitution requires no less. Utah's 
history clearly indicates that the drafters of the Utah 
Constitution would have found the Supreme Court's departure in 
Fulminante from a per se rule to be abhorrent. Utah's 
constitutional history "differs somewhat from the history and 
experience of her sister states . . . [and] must be weighed in light 
of Utah's unusual history and experience with the statehood process 
and with the process of drafting a fundamental charter of 
government." Flynn, Federalism and Viable State Government -- The 
History of Utah's Constitution, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 311, 314. 
During the drafting of Utah's constitution, the state 
legislators were mindful of the persecution just endured by the 
Mormon people. See Wallentine, Heeding the Call: Search and 
Seizure Jurisprudence Under the Utah Constitution, Article I, 
Section 14, 17 Utah J. Contemp. L. 267 (1991) (Utah's 
constitutional drafters included men who had practiced polygamy). 
The majority of present state constitutions were drafted 
in . . . an era of popular mistrust and hostility toward 
government. The people's mistrust of government is 
readily apparent on the face of many state constitutions. 
Utah's constitution, drafted in 1895, is representative 
of the era . . . 
Flynn, Federalism and Viable State Government--The History of 
Utah's Constitution, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 311, 314. The harmless 
error analysis adopted by the Supreme Court in Fulminante would 
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have been repulsive to the framers of Utah's constitution. Despite 
their recent renunciation of polygamy in exchange for statehood, 
sympathetic Utah legislators would not have tolerated coerced 
confessions being used against suspects at trial. Such erroneous 
admission of coerced statements could never be harmless. 
Regardless of the current standard under federal law, Utah's 
constitution demands that Ms. Teuscher be granted a new trial. 
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
ADMONISH THE JURORS NOT TO FORM OR EXPRESS AN 
OPINION UNTIL THE CASE IS SUBMITTED TO THEM. 
Rule 17 (j) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides: 
(j) At each recess of the court, whether the 
jurors are permitted to separate or are sequestered, they 
shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty 
not to converse among themselves or to converse with, or 
suffer themselves to be addressed by, any other person on 
the subject of the trial, and that it is their duty not 
to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is 
finally submitted to them. 
Emphasis added. 
During recesses, the jury was admonished not to discuss 
the case amongst themselves or with others. However, the jury was 
never instructed to keep an open mind and not form or express an 
opinion. See. R. 689-90 (vl.248-9), 733 (v2.35), 803 (v2.106), 866 
(V2.169), 927 (v2.230), 947A (v2.251), 1019 (v3.64), 1059 (v3.105), 
1069 (V3.115), 1093 (v3.139), 1128-9 (v3.174-5), 1144-5 (v3.190-1), 
1306 (v4.161), 1371 (v4.227) (no admonishment at all), 1423 
(V4.280), 1453 (v5.30), 1496 (v5.74), 1551 (v5.130), 1616 (v5.196), 
1658-1660 (V6.41-3), 1701 (v7.41), 1791 (v7.132), 1849 (v8.57), 
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1928 (v8.137), 1984 (v9.54), 2010 (v9.80), 2061 (v9.132), 2114 
(v9.185), 2155 (V9.227), and 2189 (closing.29). 
This trial lasted eight days, Feb. 8-12 and 16-18, and 
included a three day weekend. The State did not rest until 
approximately 5:00 P.M. on Wednesday, February 17. R. 1919 
(v8.128).22 Ms. Teuscher had no meaningful opportunity to present 
her case until Thursday, February 18, 10 days after the trial 
started. Failure to admonish the jury not to form an opinion gave 
the jury ten days to mull over the State's evidence, and form 
opinions based on that evidence, without any opportunity for the 
defense to tell its side of the story. Under the circumstances, 
Ms. Teuscher's due process right to the presumption of innocence 
has been impaired, if not vitiated. Ms. Teuscher should be granted 
a new trial. 
POINT V. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRES THAT 
MS. TEUSCHER BE GIVEN A NEW TRIAL. 
The Utah Supreme Court has established a two prong test 
for reversals for improper statements of counsel: 
The test of whether the remarks made by counsel are so 
objectionable as to merit a reversal in a criminal case 
is, did the remarks call to the attention of the jurors 
matters which they would not be justified in considering 
in determining their verdict, and were they, under the 
circumstances of the particular case, probably influenced 
by those remarks. 
Valdez, 513 P.2d at 426. 
The prosecution introduced evidence that Rocky's arrest 
occurred on his parents anniversary. R. 653 (vl.213), 7i 2 (v2.2-
22The defense called one "five minute" witness, which took 
eight transcript pages, and the proceedings adjourned at 5:25 P.M. 
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3). This information is probative of no material fact and serves 
only to inflame the jury. The prosecution asked Ms. Teuscher to 
comment on the veracity of two witnesses for the prosecution. R. 
2096-7 (v9.167-8), 2098 (v9.169). This violates State v. Emmett, 
839 P.2d 781, 787 (Utah 1992) and State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 
343-4 (Utah App. 1993), cert. denied No. 930427 (Utah December 1, 
1993). In closing argument, the prosecution argued that Ms. 
Teuscher should be convicted out of considerations for the victim. 
This violates, e.g., McCartv v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 1220 (Okla. 
Crim.App. 1988) . 
The errors here are plain. The jurors attention was 
drawn to matters they are not justified in considering. These 
errors should have been obvious to the trial court. These errors 
also affect the substantial rights of Ms. Teuscher, and were highly 
prejudicial to here. Appeals to sympathy for the victim likely 
made the jury lean more strongly towards holding someone 
responsible, even if the case had not been adequately proved. 
Asking Ms. Teuscher to comment on the veracity of other witnesses 
did irreparable injury to her credibility, and may well have tipped 
the scales in this very circumstantial case. Ms. Teuscher should 
be granted a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Teuscher's conviction 
should be reversed. 
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Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
Rule 4 04 (b) , Utah Rules of Evidence provides in pertinent 
part: 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove 
conduct; exceptions; other crimes. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove 
the character of a person in conformity therewith. It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to 
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall 
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled 
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
testify against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his 
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for 
the same offense. 
